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LIN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: 
THE CIRCUITS SPLIT ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
MARITAL STATUS IS DISPOSITIVE OF ASYLUM 
ELIGIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 
INDIVIDUALS WHO SUFFER PERSECUTION UNDER 
CHINA'S COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING 
PRACTICES 
Sara E. Stewart' 
May 1993, when I was nineteen, I was found to be pregnant. We were both so happy, 
and went to the government office to get legal paperwork for our marriage. We were 
refused because I was under 20 . ... Feeling sick, I go to the hospital. The doctor 
who examined me reported my apparent pregnancy to the government. As I had no 
legal paper for marriage and no government-approved birth-allowed documents, my 
baby was illegal and I could not have a baby . ... [T}hey took me to the hospital. 
They locked me up for hours in a small room in the hospital. They gave me a pill and 
they were to come back in about thirty minutes with a shot. They forced me to 
swallow the pill, but I escaped the shots. My boyfriend knew I was locked up. He 
gave [ one dollar J to a nurse for her to open the window. She opened the window and 
1 jumped out. Then my boyfriend took me by a car straight to Guangzhou. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lin v. United States Department of Justice, 2 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit remanded three consolidated appeals to the Board oflmmigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) for reconsideration. 3 Petitioners Shi Liang Lin, Xian Zou, and 
Zhen Hua Dong applied for asylum 4 based on persecution they and their unmarried 
girlfriends suffered under the coercive family planning practices employed by the 
People's Republic ofChina. 5 
• J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Maine School of Law. 
I. Forced Abortions and Sterilization in China: The View from the Inside: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on International Operations and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 
105th Cong. 24-25 (1998) (statement of Zhou Shiu Yon, Coercive Population Control Victim). 
2. Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005). 
3. Id at 192. 
4. Once an individual is granted asylum status in the United States he or she is eligible to apply for 
specific benefits, including an Employment Authorization Card (allowing him or her to work legally in the 
United States), an unrestricted Social Security Card, cash and medical assistance, employment assistance, 
and a refugee travel document with which he or she can travel, provided he or she does not return to the 
country from which he or she fled as a refugee. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Frequently 
Asked Questions About Asylum, http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/faq.htrn#dec3a (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2006). 
5. Lin, 416 F.3d at 188-89. See generally Erin Bergeson Huii Comment, When is the Unma"ied 
Partner of an Alien Who Has Been Forcibly Subjected to Abortion or Sterilization a "Spouse" for the 
Purpose of Asylum Eligibility? The Diverging Opinions of Ma v. Ashcroft and Chen v. Ashcroft, 2005 
UT AHL. REV. 1021, 1025-26 n.49 (2005) ( citing China: Human Rights Violation and Coercion in One Child 
Policy Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) 
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Retaining jurisdiction over the petitions after re-disposition by the BIA, the 
Second Circuit demanded that the BIA clarify two issues regarding its interpretation 
of United States' immigration laws. First, the Second Circuit insisted on a precise 
explanation of the rationale behind interpreting the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) section 60l(a) to include the "forced 
sterilization of one spouse on account of a ground protected under the Act" as an "act 
of persecution against the other spouse," resulting in the spouse's per se asylum 
eligibility.6 Secondly, the court asked the BIA to clarify ''whether, when, and why 
boyfriends and fiances may or may not similarly qualify as refugees pursuant to 
IIRIRA § 601(a)." 7 As ofMarch 29, 2006, the BIA has not yet considered the appeals 
on remand. 
Although analyzed disparately by Immigration Judges (Us), the BIA, and the 
United States Courts of Appeals,8 the question that lingers is whether refugee status, 
and the concomitant eligibility for asylum in the United States, should be extended to 
individuals who are persecuted pursuant to China's coercive family planning practices 
because their unmarried partners are forced to undergo an unwanted abortion or 
sterilization procedure. 
This Note begins with a briefoutline of the history of China's coercive population 
control and the United States' expression ofopposition to China's policies through the 
enactment and amendment of immigration law. Section IV discusses the BIA's 
ambiguous holding in In re C-Y-Z-, in which it first extended asylum status to the 
spouse of an individual directly persecuted under China's coercive population control. 
Next, it reviews two recent cases with disparate outcomes decided by the Third and 
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding whether such protection should be extended 
to the unmarried partner of a person similarly persecuted. 
(statement of John S. Aird, former Research Specialist on China, U.S. Bureau of Census), available at 
http://www.intemationalrelations.house.gov/archives/l08/97363.pdf). Aird, who filed more than 350 
affidavits on behalf of Chinese women who sought asylum based on forced sterilization or abortion, 
recounted compulsory sterilizations of Chinese women and men, the abortion and attempted abortion offull-
term fetuses, and myriad appalling methods of averting and eradicating unauthorized pregnancies and births. 
Id. 
6. Lin, 416 F.3d at 187 (quoting In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915,919 (BJ.A. 1997)). 
1. Id. at 192. As of February 20, 2006, the BIA has not had the opportunity to analyze these petitions 
on remand. 
8. See, e.g., Yuan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (expressing doubt as to 
the BIA's reasoning in C-Y-Z-); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that "spouse" 
may be interpreted to include those individuals who were married in a traditional Chinese ceremony and 
would be legally married in China but for China's coercive family planning policies); In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. at 919 (holding that IIRIRA section 601(a) demands that the spouses of those directly victimized 
by coercive family planning policies are per seas eligible for asylum as those directly victimized). But see 
Chen v. Gonzales, 152 Fed. App'x. 528,530 (7th Cir. 2005) (affrrming, without comment, the decision not 
to extend presumption of persecution to unmarried individuals); Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (agreeing with the Third Circuit's decision in Chen v. Ashcroft not to extend the presumption of 
persecution to unmarried individuals); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 227-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (determining 
that the presumption of persecution extends to spouses of women forced to undergo abortions but not to 
unmarried men). In a recent decision that never reached the issue of unmarrieds' asylum eligibility, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit characterized the case law as a "circuit split." Chen v. 
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 110, 111 (1st Cir. 2005). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 172 2007
172 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:l 
In conclusion, this Note argues for the extension of refugee status and asylum 
eligibility to unmarried partners under section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA, based, in part, on the 
reasoning put forth in the concurrence to C-Y-Z-. Although practicality and efficiency 
of process may be served by a bright-line rule restricting derivative asylum status to 
legally recognized spouses, such a limitation produces absurd and unjust results. As 
a result of China's coercive family planning practices, couples who are denied access 
to a legally recognized marriage, and who fear a traditional marriage will alert Chinese 
authorities of their unlawful cohabitation, are faced with a dismal decision: either 
remain in China and suffer continued threat and persecution, or flee to the United 
States and encounter a judicial system whose interpretation of immigration laws will 
result in the denial of asylum based on a marital status that is the consequence of 
coercive family planning laws. 
II. POPULATION BOMB 
A. China's Coercive Population Control Policies 
In 1949, the year the People's Republic was founded, China's population totaled 
541.67 million. 9 Convinced a large population was essential for productivity and 
socialist composition, the Maoist leadership ignored ample warning about the perils 
of overpopulation from China's foremost economists, and promoted population growth 
throughout the l 950s. '0 Increased fertility rates, coupled with declining mortality and 
the government's endorsement of population growth, resulted in the doubling of 
China's population in just over thirty-five years. 11 It was not until the late 1950s and 
early 1960s that China implemented its first population control policies. They were 
short-lived, however, and were thwarted by the turbulence accompanying the start of 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Although dormant for nearly a decade, the 
Chinese government's concerns about overpopulation did not disappear. 
Acute political unrest subsided in the 1970s and, shortly thereafter, the first formal 
family planning policy was announced. It took the form of a propaganda campaign 
called "wan, xi, shao" or "later, longer, fewer," and contemplated later marriages, 
longer time lapses between births, and fewer births. 12 Then, in 1979, the "one couple, 
one child" policy was adopted, limiting parents to one child. 13 The following year, the 
Marriage Law took effect 14 under which men were not permitted to marry legally until 
9. Gerrie Zhang, Comment, U.S. Asylum Policy and Population Control in the People's Republic of 
China, 18 Haus. J. INT'L L. 557,560 (1996);see also Hull, supra note 5, at 1022. 
10. In 1974, a spokesman for the Chinese government claimed that a rapid increase in population was 
"a very good thing" and the theories on population explosions were "fallac[ies] peddled by the 
superpowers." Zhang, supra note 9, at 561. 
11. Id at 560. 
12. Id at 561. 
13. Couples were limited to one child with exceptions permitted in a limited number of cases. In 1984, 
the one-child policy was modified specifically to allow ethnic minorities to have more than one child, and 
in some rural areas, parents are permitted to have more than one child. In 1988, couples in rural provinces 
were eligible to have more than one child, after a period of time, if their first child was a girl. Id at 561-62. 
14. Hull, supra note 5, at 1023 (citing Tara A. Gellman, Note, The Blurred Line Between Aiding 
Progress and Sanctioning Abuse: United States Appropriations, the UNFPA, and Family Planning in the 
P.R.C., 17N.Y.L.SCH.J.HUM.RTS. 1063, 1065(2001)). 
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the age of twenty-two and women not until the age oftwenty.1 5 Under China's 1982 
Constitution, 16 the government sets the target population 17 and endorses a family 
planning policy, thereby encouraging "delayed marriage and postponement of having 
children, giving birth to fewer but healthier children, and one family, one child .... " 18 
Notwithstanding China's stringent policies, its population continues to grow at the 
rate of sixteen million per year. 19 Meanwhile, China supports one-fifth of the total 
world population on less than eight percent of the world's arable land.20 The Chinese 
government contends that, if it is not regulated, "rapid population growth could 
threaten the subsistence of the Chinese nation, leading to a catastrophe and an exodus 
ofrefugees." 21 As reasonable as China's population concerns may be, policies that 
subject Chinese citizens to human rights violations, creating thousands of victims 
annually, 22 cannot be justified. 23 
15. Id. 
16. See XIAN FA art. 25 ( 1982) (P .R.C.) ("The state promotes family planning so that population growth 
may fit the plans for economic and social development .... "). 
17. China "hopes to reach its maximum desired population size of 1.6 billion no sooner than 2050." 
Hull, supra note 5, at 1022. 
18. Zhang, supra note 9, at 562. 
19. China to Continue Its Population Control Policy, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 5, 2005, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-01/05/content_ 2421042.htm. 
20. Hull, supra note 5, at I 022. 
21. Zhang, supra note 9, at 566. 
22. Testifying before the United States House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations, 
Harry Wu, executive director of the Laogai Research Foundation, stated that despite the recent attempts at 
reform, China's population control policy fails to conform to UN principles. In a prepared statement, Wu 
declared that: 
The one-child policy is the most pervasive source of human rights violations in China today. 
It affects every family, every woman .... A majority of Chinese women are required to use 
intrauterine devices (IUDs). Violators, if discovered to be pregnant, are coerced into having 
an abortion. Most violators of the one-child policy are forced to undergo sterilization. 
Doctors who do not perform IUD insertion or sterilization, or who fake these operations, are 
jailed. Family members of violators are often jailed if they do not reveal the violator's 
whereabouts. Despite relaxation of certain aspects of China's family planning regulations, 
enforcement of the one-child policy continues to be coercive. 
China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One-Child Policy Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. 35 (2004) (prepared statement of Harry Wu, Executive 
Director, Laogai Research Foundation), available at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/ 
archives/108/97363.pdf[hereinafter Wu statement]; see also id. at 51 (prepared statement of John S. Aird, 
Former Senior Research Specialist on China, U.S. Census Bureau) [hereinafter Aird statement]. Aird stated 
that in the last four or five years "foreign journalists in China have cited instances of violent family planning 
measures more extreme than any reported previously in the one-child policy's 25 year history." Id. 
23. Leaders of the communist government in China, such as Jiang Zemin, have attempted to justify 
China's coercive policies by touting its positive impact on economic well-being and stability. Wu statement, 
supra note 22, at 36. The same leaders have relied on the ratio of China's massive population to the small 
amount of land capable of supporting agricultural activities, arguing that harsh measures are necessary to 
restrict population and guarantee there is sufficient food for everyone to eat. Id. However, these arguments 
are groundless; "[w]hat China needs most in order to thrive is a free political and social system." Id. Wu 
argues that by analogizing to the situations in Japan and Taiwan China's argument can be refuted. Id. With 
a "population of more than 1.3 billion, 22% of the world and only just over 9% of arable land of the world, 
Japan and Taiwan enjoy[] relatively prosperous economic conditions and stability." Id. In contrast to 
China, "Japan and Taiwan [have] free and open political and social system[s] that drive[] [their] success." 
Id. 
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B. China's Enforcement Mechanism 
There is ample evidence that the Chinese government knowingly continues to 
employ coercive tactics in order to achieve lower birth rates, especially in rural 
provinces. 24 To guarantee compliance with China's one-child plan, family planning 
officials use insidious techniques, ranging from political pressure and public 
degradation to invasive medical procedures. 25 A volunteer network consisting of 
thirteen million cadres oversees the distribution and use of contraceptives and regulates 
unlawful pregnancies in their communities. 26 In some provinces, every woman's 
menstrual cycle and choice of contraceptive is publicly tracked and women who avoid 
the policy are publicly humiliated. 27 
Among the most severe practices relied on by officials are forced late-term 
abortions, obligatory sterilization, and non-consensual insertion of intrauterine 
devices.28 Recently, however, more extreme measures have been reported. 29 Although 
24. Chinese leadership has consistently "signaled" to their subordinates that coercive strategies were 
expected. Aird statement, supra note 22, at 54. As early as the 1980s Deng Xiaoping clarified this position. 
Id. In 1981, Chen Muhua, the head of family planning, purportedly quoted Deng as stating, "In order to 
reduce the population, use whatever means you must, but do it!" Id. Hoping to calm the fears of local 
family planning officials, and worried that they would be accused of utilizing coercion, Chen said, "With 
the support of the Party Central Committee, you should have nothing to fear." Id. In 1983, Premier Zhao 
Ziyang told local family planning officials to "prevent additional births by all means." Id. Moreover, there 
is abundant evidence that coercive policies continue today. As late as March 11, 2001, Jiang Zemin 
pronounced that population control was a "major affair for strengthening the country, enriching the people, 
and maintaining tranquility .... " Id. at 55. Its successful continuance required "really effective measures" 
and necessitated that the government "grasp ever more tightly and still do better with this major item of 
economic and social work without the slightest slackness or relaxation." Id. Aird argues, "When the central 
authorities issue injunctions such as these and do not include warnings to avoid coercion, the lower levels 
know what is expected of them!" Id. 
25. Hull, supra note 5, at 1025; see also Kimberly Sicard, Note, Section 601 of/IR/RA: A Long Road 
lo a Resolution of United Stales Asylum Policy Regarding Coercive Methods of Population Control, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 927, 930 (2000). 
26. Sicard, supra note 25, at 930. It should be noted that local family planning cadres and officials are 
also victims of governmental coercion. Through a system referred to as "veto with one vote," those cadres 
and officials who fail to meet family planning goals were to be deemed an utter failure in their annual 
evaluations, irrespective of their achievements in other areas of responsibility and are punished accordingly. 
Aird statement, supra note 22, at 59. Literally, a "failure in family planning 'vetoed' all other 
achievements." Id. 
27. Hull, supra note 5, at 1025. 
28. Id. at I 025-26. 
29. In February of 2001, Amnesty International reported an incident in Changsha, Hunan Province that 
occurred in May 1998, involving a man named Zhou whose wife left for Guangdong Province to seek work. 
Aird statement, supra note 22, at 56. Family planning officials in Changsha suspected that she was pregnant 
without permission and, in an attempt to force him to disclose her location, captured and tortured her 
husband twice. Id. The second time, he was "denied food, hung upside down, whipped and beaten with 
wooden clubs and burned with cigarette butts." Id. He became "doubly incontinent, his body covered with 
excrement. The officials reportedly then branded his lower body with soldering irons, tied a wire around 
his genitals, and ripped off his penis. Zhou died on 15 May 1998." Id. In August of 2000, in Caidian 
Township, Hubei Province, cadres kidnapped a newborn baby boy from the arms of a retired doctor as she 
was taking him home to care for him. Id. In a nearby flooded paddy field, within site of the doctor and 
neighbors, they drowned the baby in shallow water. Id. 
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incidents of death in connection with family planning practices are rare, the few stories 
that make the headlines "probably represent many more incidents, no word of which 
has reached the international media." 30 The Chinese government shields these 
atrocities from Chinese journalists, insists that they are fabricated, and forces 
journalists and victims to publicly admit to lying.31 
In addition to coercive measures, the Chinese government exploits "non-coercive" 
techniques, including "economic and social incentives and disincentives, propaganda 
and education." 32 Couples who promise to comply with the one-child policy receive 
monthly stipends and preferred access to medical treatment and education. 33 More-
over, the government offers benefits such as "larger living quarters, better child care, 
and longer maternity leave .... "34 On the contrary, noncompliance results in penalties 
that "range from fines, job demotions, and withholding of social services, to loss of 
employment, imprisonment, and confiscation or destruction ofproperty." 3s 
III. THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS TO CHINA'S COERCIVE PRACTICES 
A. Asylum Law and Policy 
In order to establish eligibility for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA), an individual must prove that she is a refugee within the meaning of the 
statute. 36 The INA defines refugee as one who is ''unable or unwilling to avail himself 
or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion." 37 Although the applicant bears the burden of 
proving that she meets the statutory definition of refugee, the Attorney General 
nonetheless retains ultimate discretion to grant or deny any application. 38 
Although an affirmative finding of refugee status will not necessarily result in a 
conferral of asylum, 39 such a conclusion forbids deportation of the applicant to a 
country where her life or liberty is threatened on account of her race, religion, nation-
30. Id. at 57. 
3 I. Id. at 58. 
32. Hui~ supra note 5, at 1025. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. See Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184,187 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 8 U.S.C. § I I0l(a)(42) 
(1994)). The Immigration and Nationality Act can be foundat8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000 & Supp. I 2001 
& Supp. II 2002). 
37. 8 U.S.C. § I I0l(a)(42) (1994). After the Supreme Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA 
has held that an asylum applicant must establish that "a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear 
persecution [and] that his fear of persecution is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable." 
Zhang, supra note 9, at 576 (quoting In re R-0-, Int. Dec. 3170 at 5 (BJ.A. 1992) (citations omitted)); see 
also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that Congress used different, broader language 
to define the term refugee, as used in § 208(a), than it used to describe the class of aliens who had a right 
to withholding of deportation under§ 243(h), and thus, the U and the BIA erred in applying the "more likely 
than not" objective standard of proof from § 243(h) to respondent's § 208(a) asylum claim and should have 
instead applied the more generous, subjective "well founded fear" standard). 
38. Lin, 416 F.3d at 187. 
39. Id. 
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ality, membership in a specific social grotip, or political opinion. 40 To establish eligibi-
lity for withholding of deportation, a non-citizen must demonstrate that she faces the 
"clear probability of persecution," a standard more stringent than that required to 
establish asylum.41 Thus, if an applicant fails to obtain asylum, she will necessarily 
not be eligible for withholding of deportation. 
Where an applicant establishes eligibility based on past persecution, she creates 
the presumption ofa ''well-founded fear ofpersecution." 42 Such a presumption may 
be rebutted, however, based on a preponderance of the evidence demonstrating that a 
"fundamental change in circumstances" has occurred "such that the applicant no longer 
has a well-founded fear of persecution,'"' 3 which often results in the denial of an 
asylum application. 
B. From "Careful Consideration" to the Amended Definition of 
Refugee Under 1/RIRA 
Since China initiated its coercive population control practices, the United States 
has expressed opposition to China's coercive family planning policies. However, it 
was not until 1998 that the United States government made the first administrative 
pronouncement requiring all asylum adjudicators to give "careful consideration" to 
applications filed by Chinese nationals who articulated a fear of persecution because 
of their refusal to undergo a sterilization procedure or to abort a pregnancy in 
resistance to China's population control policies. 44 Nine years earlier, in In re Chang, 
the BIA refused to extend refugee status to a Chinese national who fled China after the 
birth of his second child because Chinese officials threatened to sterilize him. 45 
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(I) (1994). This section provides: "The Attorney General shall not deport or 
return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would 
be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion." Id. 
41. See INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407,424 (1984). 
42. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(I) (2006). 
43. Id.§ 1208.13(b)(l)(i)(A). Previously, the regulation required proof of changed country conditions 
in lieu of the current requirement of a "fundamental change in circumstances." Hull, supra note 5, at I 028 
n.66 (quoting In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915,919 (B.I.A. 1997)). In 2001, the language was altered so 
that "other changes in circumstances surrounding the asylum claim, including a fundamental change in 
personal circumstances, may be considered, so long as those changes are fundamental in nature and go to 
the basis of the fear of persecution." The low preponderance of the evidence standard, coupled with the 
broadened conception of"fundamental circumstances," arguably makes it less difficult for the government 
to rebut an asylum applicant's "well founded fear of persecution." Id ( quoting In re Y -T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
601, 604-05 (B.I.A. 2003)). 
44. Zhang, supra note 9, at 578. This directive for enhanced consideration came in the form of a 
memorandum drafted by then-Attorney General Edwin Meese ID. The memorandum mandated that if the 
refusal to submit to China's intrusive procedures was "an act of conscience with full awareness" of the 
importance the Chinese government placed on its family planning policies and with a knowledge of the 
likely consequences of such a defiance, it would be appropriate to interpret such non-cooperation "as an act 
of political defiance sufficient to establish refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § I JOl(a)(42)(A)." Id. (quoting 
Memorandum from Edwin Meese ID, Attorney General to Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner, Immigration & 
Naturalization Service (Aug. 5, 1988)). Thus, a finding of well-founded fear would be reasonable under 
those circumstances. 
45. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 47 (B.1.A. 1989). The BIA determined that policy guidelines 
contained in administrative pronouncements were directed at the INS, and thus, did not apply to decisions 
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Congress responded to the BIA's decision with an attempt to pass the Emergency 
Chinese Immigration Relief Act.46 
Despite overwhelming support for the Bill in both Houses, 47 then-President 
George H. W. Bush vetoed it, announcing that he would provide the same immigration 
benefits administratively that the bill offered, while maintaining the ability to manage 
foreign relations. 48 Concurrent to his pronouncement, President Bush directed the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General to provide "enhanced consideration ... 
for individuals from any country who express a fear of persecution upon return to their 
country related to that country's policy of forced abortion or coerced sterilization." 49 
By Executive Order in April of 1990, President Bush "reaffirmed his original 
directive" requiring "enhanced consideration." 50 
Thereafter, Attorney General Thornburgh amended the INA and promulgated an 
interim rule providing that asylum applicants ''who have a well-founded fear that they 
will be required to abort a pregnancy or to be sterilized ... may be granted asylum on 
the ground of persecution on account of political opinion. "51 The amended regulations 
allowed the applicant or her spouse to be granted asylum if either of them refused to 
abort a pregnancy or undergo a sterilization procedure in violation of their country's 
family planning policy. 52 Inexplicably, in the asylum regulations, published in July of 
1990, the INS omitted the interim rule, reinstating In re Chang. 53 
Inconsistency in immigration policy resulted in irreconcilable adjudication. 54 In 
1994, after a protracted inter-agency review of conflicting policy, the Clinton admini-
stration declared that the INS was permitted in certain cases to provide "discretionary 
humanitarian relief' outside of the context of asylum. 55 But this policy was criticized 
for its ambiguity; there was no indication of how long the policy was to remain in 
effect or whether asylum relief extended to the applicants' family members. 56 
made by immigration judges and the BIA. Id. at 43. In re Chang was designated a precedent decision and 
therefore was binding on immigration judges and the INS. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(g) (1995). 
46. Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, S. 1370, 101st. Cong. (1989). 
4 7. The House of Representatives passed the bill by a vote of 403-0, and the Senate passed it by voice 
vote. President Vetoes Chinese Student Bill, Offers Administrative Relief Instead, 66 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1313, 1314 (1989). 
48. Zhang, supra note 9, at 581 (citing Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese 
Immigration Relief Act of 1989, 25 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1853, 1853-54 (1989)). 
49. Id. (quoting Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 
1989, 25 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1853, 1853 (1989)). 
50. Id. at 582 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,711, 3 C.F.R. 283 (I 991)). 
51. Id (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. 2803 (Jan. 29, 1990)). 
52. 55 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2805 (Jan. 29, 1990). 
53. Zhang, supra note 9, at 582-83; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
54. See generally Zhang, supra note 9, at 582-88. 
55. Id. at 590. Discretionary measures were only exercised where the applicant displayed a "credible 
fear" of returning to China based on an imminent danger of forced abortion or sterilization, the threat of 
severe harm for refusal to submit to abortion or sterilization, or the risk of grave harm for violating other 
family planning practices. Id at 591. The relief offered was a stay of deportation for an unspecified amount 
oftime. Id. 
56. Id at 592. One critic, an immigration policy consultant, proffered that President Clinton's directive 
would result in "a profusion of asylum policies among the 36 INS districts" because INS district directors 
would be "free to expand individual interpretation in granting stays of deportation .... " James H. Walsh, 
Passing the Buck on Immigration, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1994, at Al 8. 
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Finally, in 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA, 57 mandating that the BIA recognize 
"persecution" where an individual has suffered under China's coercive population 
control policies. 58 Congress achieved this recognition by expanding the INA's 
definition of"refugee." 59 Before IIRIRA's passage, Congress held a series ofhearings 
on the issue of coercive population control in China. One of the main sponsors of the 
amendment, Congressman Christopher Smith, noted that forced abortion and 
sterilization were "among the most gruesome human rights violations." 60 Since 
IIRIRA's enactment, the BIA and the courts have consistently extended the statute's 
protections to the husbands of women forced to undergo abortion and/or sterilization 
procedures. 61 Arguably, by providing relief for partners persecuted as a result of an 
"unlawful" pregnancy and by keeping families together, these decisions further 
congressional intent.62 
Simultaneous to enacting IIRIRA, Congress implemented a one-thousand-per-
fiscal-year cap on the number of Chinese citizens eligible for asylum under IIRIRA. 63 
57. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
58. See Michelle Chen, Leaving One Child Behind: Chinese Immigrants Seek Asylum in America from 
China's One-Child Policy, 2005-DEC LEGAL A.FF. 8, 9 (2005). 
59. Section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA amended the original definition of refugee under section JOl(a)(42) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. The following sentence was added: 
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has been forced to abort a 
pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or 
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control 
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a 
person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure 
or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well 
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(I), 
I JO Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I IOl(a)(42) (2000)). Interestingly, the 
1996 amendment was motivated in part by the controversy in the United States regarding abortion rights. 
Chen, supra note 58, at 9. Condemning China's family planning policy as a widespread human rights abuse, 
anti-abortion groups lobbied Congress to oppose coercive family planning. Id 
60. Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Operations 
& Human Rights of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Rep. 
Christopher Smith). 
61. See, e.g., Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that where China's marriage 
laws prevent a legal marriage, a traditional marriage should be recognized for the purposes of establishing 
asylum status based on the forced abortion of the petitioner's de facto wife); He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 
603-04 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that where the petitioner's wife underwent a sterilization procedure, the 
petitioner was automatically eligible for asylum); Qui v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(acknowledging that where a petitioner's wife undergoes either a forced abortion or sterilization, he is 
eligible for asylum). In these cases, neither the INS nor the BIA called into question the petitioners' lack 
of a legally recognized marriage certificate, nor did the lack of a Chinese marriage certificate result in the 
denial of their asylum applications. Ma, 361 F.3d at 559 n.8. 
62. See Ma, 361 F.3dat 559 (citingH.R. Rep. No. 104-469(1), at 174 (1996)). But see Chen v. Ashcroft, 
381 F.3d 221,222 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the BIA's decision that asylum based on China's coercive 
family planning policies can only be granted to "spouses," which contributes to "efficient administration" 
while avoiding "difficult and problematic factual inquiries, is reasonable" even though it may produce 
"undesirable results" in certain cases). 
63. Chen, 381 F.3d at 225. The statute provides, "For any fiscal year, not more than a total of 1,000 
refugees may be ... granted asylum ... pursuant to a determination under the third sentence of section 
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Pursuant to section lOl(g) of the REAL ID Act, 64 the cap was repealed in 2005. 
Currently, the issue of whether asylum relief will be extended to unmarried partners 
of victims of China's family planning policy has erupted into what the First Circuit 
describes as "an active circuit split." 65 
IV. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 60l(A) OF IIRIRA 
A. In re C-Y-Z-: The BIA Interprets Section 601 (a) of IIRIRA to 
Protect the Spouse of a Victim 
In 1997, the BIA had its first opportunity to apply the amended definition of 
refugee, determining that the statutory amendment extended asylum eligibility to an 
applicant whose "legally recognized" spouse was forced to undergo a sterilization 
procedure. 66 In C-Y-Z-, the applicant fled China and, upon arriving in the United 
States, applied for asylum based on his wife's forced sterilization procedure. 67 
Relying on the enactment of section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA and the INS's stance that 
past persecution of one spouse can be proved by forced abortion or sterilization of the 
other spouse, 68 the BIA overruled the Immigration Judge's (IJ's) decision. 69 Granting 
the applicant's request for asylum, the BIA held that a non-citizen whose spouse was 
compelled to undergo an abortion or sterilization may establish past persecution as a 
I0I(a)(42) (relating to persecution for resistance to coercive population control methods)." Id. at n.2 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § I 157(a)(5) (2000)). As of September 2003, the total list of eligible individuals awaiting 
a grant of asylum was over seven thousand. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, EOIR Notifies 
Persons Eligible for Full Asylum Benefits for Fiscal Year 2003 Based on Coercive Population Control 
Policies (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/03/CPCAsylumRelease0903.pdf. 
Thus, applicants who are afforded conditional asylum must wait at least seven years before full asylum 
benefits, including applying for lawful permanent residence status and the ability to petition for the admis-
sion into the United States of family members not contemplated by the original asylum application. Id. 
64. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § I0l(g), 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (repealing the IIRIRA provision that originally 
implemented the cap). 
65. Chen v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 110, 111 (1st Cir. 2005). 
66. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915,918 (B.1.A. 1997). 
67. Id. at 915-16. The sterilization procedure was imposed as punishment for their violation of China's 
one-child policy. Id. 
68. Id. at 918. In a memorandum issued on October 21, 1996, the INS expressly stated that "an 
applicant whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or involuntary sterilization has suffered past 
persecution, and may thereby be eligible for asylum under the terms of the new refugee definition." Id. 
(quoting Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Svc. on 
Asylum Based on Coercive Family Planning Policies-§ 601 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 4 (Oct. 21, 1996)). Moreover, in its brief, the INS conceded that "the 
husband of a sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes and make a bona fide and non-frivolous 
application for asylum based on problems impacting more intimately on her than on him." Id. 
69. Id. at 919. The U reasoned that it seemed that the Chinese government merely "put some roadblocks 
in this applicant and his wife's way in having their family." Id. at 916. Although he recognized the wife's 
forced sterilization procedure, he noted that the applicant did not have many other issues in China and that 
his wife "did not gain anything from having the applicant abandon her and the children for the United 
States." Id. Finally, the U held that the applicant "himself, has never been persecuted and he cannot show 
either past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution." Id. In the U's defense, his decision was 
rendered prior to the enactment of section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA. Id. at 915. 
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result of his political opinion in opposition to China's family planning policy, thereby 
qualifying as a refugee within the amended definition. 70 
B. Circuit Split: Does Section 60J(a) of JJRJRA Apply to the Unmarried 
Partner of a Victim? 
Based on the BIA's reasoning in C-Y-Z-, unmarried applicants have attempted to 
establish past persecution and asylum status in the United States by virtue of an 
unmarried partner's forced abortion or sterilization at the hands of the Chinese govern-
ment. Arguing to extend the reasoning in C-Y-Z- has been especially persuasive where 
a couple is precluded from registering their marriage as a result of China's severe 
marriage laws. Although arguably distinguishable on the facts, 71 two decisions by the 
Ninth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals analyzed the issue to conflicting ends. 
In Ma v. Ashcroft, 72 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision to overrule the 
IJ's determination to grant Ma asylum based on the forced abortion of his de facto 
''wife." 73 After considering the applicability of section 601(a) to the de facto 
"husband" 74 of a Chinese woman whose pregnancy was forcefully aborted during the 
third trimester, the Ninth Circuit held that "husbands whose marriages would be 
legally recognized, but for China's coercive family planning policies," were entitled 
to asylum as a result of their wives' forced sterilization or abortion. 75 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that China's prohibition of underage marriage "is inextricably linked" 
to its coercive family planning policies and specifically aimed at reducing the period 
70. Id at 9 I 9-20. 
71. See Hull, supra note 5, at 1038 (citing two major factual distinctions between the two cases). First, 
Ma was married to his wife in a traditional ceremony in their village, whereas Chen never formalized his 
relationship with his girlfriend. Second, during his lengthy detention in Guam as an "illegal immigrant," 
Ma turned twenty-two, registered his marriage with the Chinese government, and received a marriage 
certificate. Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 556-57 (9th Cir. 2004). Unlike Ma, Chen never registered his 
marriage with the Chinese government. Hull, supra note 5, at 1038-39. In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in Ma, the Third Circuit refused to recognize that its decision in Chen created a circuit split on the 
issue of eligibility of unmarried partners. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 23 I (3d. Cir. 2005). 
72. 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Zheng v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 993, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that China's coercive birth control program would render Zheng eligible for asylum based on his 
wife's forced abortion despite the fact that they were not legally married). 
73. Ma, 361 F.3d at 559. The U assigned to Ma's application concluded that refugee status was "not 
limited to individuals who actually undergo a[ n] involuntary abortion or sterilization but appears to 
encompass those who would offer resistance to coercive population control programs." Id at 556. The U 
reasoned as follows: 
Id. 
In a situation where a marriage cannot be registered because foreign law precludes marriage 
by men under the age of [twenty-two], while no visa petition for example, could be granted 
on a spouse ... petition, there does not appear to be a logical or statutory basis to rule that 
a common law husband cannot meet his burden of proof when his common law wife has had 
a forced abortion. 
74. Because Ma was prohibited from marrying his girlfriend, Chiu, as a result of China's marriage laws, 
Ma and Chiu were married in a traditional Chinese ceremony. Id. at 555. However, during his lengthy 
detention in the United States, Ma turned twenty-two and legally registered his marriage with the Chinese 
government. Id. at 557. He presented this certificate recognizing his de facto marriage to the BIA on appeal 
from the !J's grant of his asylum application. Id. 
75. Id. at 561. 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 181 2007
2007] MARITAL STATUS &ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY 181 
of time during which Chinese couples can legally reproduce. 76 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit recognized that in the case of C-Y-Z-, where the male petitioner entered into 
a marriage deemed illegal by the Chinese government because the woman was under-
age, the BIA did not deny relief on the ground that the petitioner failed to produce a 
marriage "registration" certificate from the Chinese government, nor did the BIA refer 
to the lack of marriage registration as an issue to be considered in reviewing asylum 
petitions. 77 
The Ninth Circuit found that denying asylum to applicants who are not permitted 
to marry because of China's intrusive family planning policies would subvert 
Congress's intent "to provide relief for 'couples' persecuted on account of an 
'unauthorized' pregnancy and to keep families together." 78 Holding otherwise, the 
court reasoned, would create "absurd" results, whereby a woman would be eligible for 
asylum but her husband would not, forcing the separation of a de facto husband and 
wife.79 Interpreting section 601(a) in this manner is "at odds not only with the 
provision at issue here, but also with significant parts of our overall immigration 
policy." 80 The Ninth Circuit asserted that it is "absurd and wholly unacceptable" to 
deny asylum to a person based solely on the consequence of a population control 
policy expressly "deemed by Congress to be oppressive and persecutory;" 81 it goes 
against the purpose and policies of the statutory amendment outlined in IIRIRA. 
About five months after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ma v. Ashcroft, the Third 
Circuit decided Chen v. Ashcroft. 82 Similar to Ma, Chen was not permitted to marry 
his live-in girlfriend, Chen Gui, because of China's inflated minimum age marriage 
requirement. 83 When Chen Gui became pregnant, local family planning officials were 
alerted. 84 Although she went into hiding, Chen Gui was eventually captured and 
forced to undergo an abortion in the eighth month of her pregnancy. 85 Shortly 
thereafter, Chen left China for the United States and applied for asylum. 86 Analogizing 
to C-Y-Z-, the IJ granted relief and the BIA reversed, holding that the reasoning in "C-
Y-Z- had 'not been extended to unmarried partners .... "' 87 Chen appealed the BIA's 
decision to the Third Circuit.88 
Then Third Circuit Judge, now Justice Samuel Alito rejected Chen's argument that 
the BIA's interpretation of section 601(a) was "arbitrary and capricious" under the 
76. Id. at 560. 
77. Id. at 559 n.8. 
78. Id. at 559. 
79. Id. at 561. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 559. 
82. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004). 
83. Id. at 223. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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Chevron doctrine. 89 Although the BIA' s decision to use marital status as the dispositive 
factor in an asylum petition is over-and-under-inclusive, Judge Alito found that the 
BIA could have logically concluded that "aliens who are married are more likely than 
aliens not so situated to be severely injured ... when their partners are forced to 
endure forced abortions or sterilization." 90 From an administrative perspective, with 
efficacy of procedure as the goal, the existence of a marriage can be easily proven 
through "objective documentary evidence." 91 Moreover, without such a requirement, 
applicants would be encouraged to falsify an intimate relationship in order to increase 
their chances of securing asylum in the United States.92 A bright-line rule prevents 
intractable factual inquiries into the private lives of asylum applicants. 
Finally, Judge Alito found the mere fact that Chen was denied access to marriage 
because of China's family planning laws was inconsequential. 93 Unlike the Ninth 
Circuit, the Third Circuit found no evidence that the BIA's bright-line rule requiring 
a legally recognized marriage subverted congressional intent.94 Analyzing section 
60l(a), the court held that because "persecution" was left "completely undefined," 
Congress intended to leave the interpretational authority in the hands of the BIA, 
"including the ability to decide, within a reasonable range, the precise contours of[the 
term's] meaning." 95 Additionally, the court found the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ma 
v. Ashcroft inconsistent with the I 000-person-per-year statutory cap because Congress 
could not have "intended to dramatically broaden the notion of 'persecution' with 
respect to persons suffering under coercive population [ control] programs .... "96 
Thus, the Third Circuit held that, "assuming ... C-Y-Z-permissibly applied the 1996 
amendment to spouses, ... the BIA's decision not to extend C-Y-Z- to unmarried 
partners is reasonable" and worthy of Chevron deference. 97 
Upon this cracked foundation, the Second Circuit decided Lin v. United States 
Department of Justice. 98 
V. THE LIN DECISION 
In Lin v. United States Department of Justice, three Chinese citizens sought 
judicial review of the BIA's decisions to affirm the IJ's denial of each of their asylum 
applications. According to their petitions, Lin and Zou suffered persecution when their 
89. Under principles set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc., the 
BIA's interpretation of section 60l(a) to exclude from eligibility for asylum the unmarried partners of 
individuals who were forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization was entitled to deference unless it was 
"arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 223-24 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)). 
90. Id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 229. 
93. See id. at 229-3 I. 
94. Id. at 231-32. 
95. Id. at 232 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)); see also 
Hull, supra note 5, at 1037. 
96. Chen, 381 F.3d at 233. 
97. Id. at 235. 
98. 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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girlfriends, whom they were not permitted to marry, 99 were kidnapped by Chinese 
family planning officials, taken to local hospitals, and forced to undergo late-term 
abortions. 100 The devastating events and attendant fear of subsequent persecution 
drove Lin and Zou to seek refuge in the United States. Upon their arrival, they 
promptly applied for asylum. 
Similarly, Dong endured persecution at the hands of the Chinese government 
when his fiance' 0 ' discovered she was pregnant during a routine gynecological exam 
in August of 1998. What started out as a routine physical exam morphed into a 
nightmare when family planning officials forcefully aborted her baby 102 on that same 
day and warned Dong that he would face fines and sterilization if she ever were to 
become pregnant again. Notwithstanding the threat, Dong's fiance became pregnant 
in May of 1999. Fearing for the life of her baby and her fiance, she fled their village, 
but ultimately was captured and forced to undergo an abortion late in her third 
trimester. 103 Depressed and afraid, Dong escaped China and applied for asylum in the 
United States, hoping to secure asylum for his fiance as well. 
The essential issue presented to the Second Circuit on appeal was whether section 
601(a) ofIIRIRA could be interpreted to extend asylum eligibility to the unmarried 
partner of an individual forced to undergo an abortion and/or sterilization procedure. 104 
The IJ responsible for considering Lin's asylum application denied asylum, refusing 
to extend the reasoning in C-Y-Z- because Lin was not married to the victim who 
suffered persecution directly. The IJ stated, "it would not be appropriate to expand ... 
Matter of C-Y-Z-, to include unmarried couples." 105 Such an expansion "would be 
inappropriate because, inter alia, Congress had imposed a 1,000 person-per-year cap 
on the number of persons eligible for asylum under IIRIRA § 601(a)." 106 The IJ 
assigned to Zou's case rejected his application, arguing that there was "absolutely no 
way that§ 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and supporting case law 
apply" because Zou had not married his girlfriend in either a traditional or legal 
ceremony. 107 Finally, a third IJ denied Dong's application, holding that the BIA had 
refused to extend the reasoning in C-Y-Z- to protect "fiancees or girlfriends or 
99. Id. at 188. Moreover, Zou claimed that he and his girlfriend did not have a traditional wedding 
banquet because they did not want anyone to know that they were illegally cohabitating. Brief for Petitioner 
Zou at 4, Lin, 416 F.3d 184 (No. 03-40837-ag). Lin and his girlfriend attempted to get married but were 
denied the right because she had not reached the required age. Brief for Petitioner Lin at 4, Lin, 416 F.3d 
184 (No. 02-4611). 
100. Lin, 416 F.3d at 188. Upon hearing of his girlfriend's maltreatment, Zou rushed to the hospital 
where he was "shoved" by local cadres (communist officials) and chased into the mountains where he hid 
for several hours. Brief for Petitioner Zou, supra note 99, at 6. 
IO I. Dong and his fiance did not get married because he was not yet of legal age. While they were 
engaged, his fiance got pregnant out of plan. Brief for Petitioner Dong at 3, Lin, 416 F.3d 184 (No. 02-
4629). 
102. Lin, 416 F.3d at 188. 
103. Id. at 189. 
I 04. Each of the petitioners raised other issues for determination by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. See Brief for Petitioner Lin, supra note 99, at 2; Brief for Petitioner Dong, supra note 101, at 2; 
Brief for Petitioner Zou, supra note 99, at 2. However, these issues are outside of the scope of this Note. 
105. Lin, 416 F.3d at 188. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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boyfriends of people who have been forced to undergo an involuntary abortion or 
sterilization." 108 Accordingly, the IJs did not permit any of the three asylum petitioners 
to establish eligibility for asylum in connection with their fiancees' forced abortions. 
The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ's decision in each case. In other words, "a single 
Board member affirmed, without opinion, the results of the IJ's decision below," 
pursuant to the BIA's "streamlining regulations." 109 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an IJ's 
interpretation of the INA, and specifically section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA, is not entitled to 
Chevron deference. 110 In some instances, individual IJ decisions may be entitled to a 
lesser form of Skidmore deference. 111 The Second Circuit found that the BIA in C-Y-
Z- failed to "articulate a reasoned basis for making spouses eligible for asylum under 
IIRIRA § 60l(a)" and, therefore, "IJs cannot possibly advance principled-let alone 
persuasive-reasons" for distinguishing between spousal eligibility and the eligibility 
of boyfriends and fiances. 112 Moreover, because "a fresh look at C-Y-Z- reveals that 
the BIA never adequately explained how or why ... it construed IIRIRA § 60l(a)" to 
allow spouses of the direct victims of coercive family planning to become eligible for 
asylum, even upon a de novo review of section 60l(a) of IIRIRA, it would be 
"impossible" to determine whether to affirm or to reverse the BIA's decision. 113 
The court clarified that it was not suggesting that there could "be no such basis" 
for granting eligibility to the spouses, or even to the boyfriends or fiances, of the direct 
victims of persecution; rather, the court was merely highlighting the fact that the BIA, 
the sole administrative body possessed of the authority to supply such a reasoned basis, 
never did. 114 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the court stated that it would not 
108. Id. at 189. 
109. Id. 
110. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) 
(holding that where a statute is silent or unclear, courts will defer to an administrative agency's reasonable 
interpretation of that statute). The Second Circuit declared that although the Attorney General expressly 
delegated rulemaking authority to the BIA, there is no rule or regulation indicating that the Attorney General 
either delegated or ever intended to delegate the same authority to Us. Based in part on the fact that 
regulations are made through formal procedures involving advance public notice and comment, the Second 
Circuit determined that rulings by Us are not customarily afforded Chevron deference. Lin, 416 F .3d at I 90. 
It follows that because Us lack the capacity to issue legally binding decisions, they cannot possibly possess 
the requisite ability to promulgate a rule on behalf of the Attorney General. Id. Finally, when the BIA 
summarily affirms the decision ofan U, the BIA's own regulations hold that the BIA approves only the 
result reached in the decision below, not necessarily the reasoning relied upon to reach the decision. Id. 
111. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("[T]he rulings, interpretations 
and opinions of[administrative agencies], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, 
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance."). 
112. Lin, 416 F.3d at 191. 
113. Id. For example, the BIA never explained the precise statutory language pursuant to which it 
deemed spouses eligible for asylum under IIRIRA section 60l(a), nor did the BIA elucidate the reasoning 
that motivated its preferred construction. Id. In fact, the Court opined that "frankly'' it appeared that the 
BIA's analysis in C-Y-Z-"rested largely on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's concession in that 
case." Id.; see also In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997) (professing that the Service 
conceded that "the husband of a sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes"). 
114. Lin, 416 F.3d at 191. 
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be "conscripted into making policy" for "myriad and obvious reasons .... " 115 Such 
an activity, the court explained, is "more properly the province of other bodies, 
particularly where, as here, the other body [(the BIA)) is an agency that can bring to 
bear particular subject matter expertise."' 16 
Notwithstanding arguments advanced by Lin, Dong, Zou, and the United States 
Government, the Second Circuit held that it could not "reasonably" ascertain the status 
of boyfriend and fiance eligibility under IIRIRA section 60 l(a). 117 It left for the BIA 
to determine whether "permissible distinctions can be drawn between spousal eligi-
bility, on the one hand, and boyfriend and fiance eligibility, on the other[,]" or whether 
''the rationale for spousal eligibility applies with equal logic and force to the eligibility 
ofboyfriends and fiances." 118 Moreover, the court stated that it cannot know whether 
to apply spousal eligibility to boyfriends and fiances "[ u ]ntil the BIA has clarified why 
it established spousal eligibility in the first instance .... " 119 Satisfied with its judicial 
rebuff, the Second Circuit retained jurisdiction and remanded the consolidated appeals 
to the BIA, demanding that it elucidate the reasoning behind C-Y-Z-.120 
VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Divergent Conclusions in Ma v. Ashcroft and Chen v. Ashcroft 
Customarily, the United States respects the marriage rules and regulations 
enforced in foreign countries, including the implementation of a minimum age 
115. Id. at I 92; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947) ("It will not do for a court 
to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action; nor can a court be expected to chisel 
that which must be precise from what the agency has left vague and indecisive."). 
116. Lin,416F.3dat 192. 
117. Id. The Government argued that the Second Circuit could merely supply its own rationale for the 
BIA's determination in C-Y-Z- and then act in accordance with that rationale. Id. However, the Second 
Circuit rejected the offer. See id ( quoting Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196-97). Conversely, petitioner Lin 
argued that the U and the BIA "misapplied the statutory definition of refugee in failing to recognize that [he] 
was eligible for asylum" under IIRIRA section 601(a). Brief for Petitioner Lin, supra note 99, at 14. Lin 
averred that he met the definition because he had a well-founded fear that he would be persecuted for his 
resistance to China's obtrusive birth control policy and that the Chinese government forced his fiance to 
abort their child. Id. at I 5. Citing to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ma, Lin argued that the mere fact that 
he was not married to the mother of his aborted child should not be dispositive where, as here, the lack of 
a marriage certificate is the result of the implementation of obtrusive family planning policies such as 
minimum age requirements. Id. at 16-17. Similarly, petitioner Zou argued that Congress's express purpose 
in amending the asylum definition was to grant relief to asylum seekers in Zou's circumstances; the BIA's 
interpretation that section 601(a) ofIIRIRA was inapplicable in his case was patently unreasonable. Brief 
for Petitioner Zou, supra note 99, at 17. Where, as here, "Chinese birth control policy was the sole reason 
that [Zou] and his wife were unable to officially marry[,] ... the act of cohabitating and conceiving the child 
itself constituted an act of'resistance' to birth control policy." Id. at 21. Moreover, Zou argued that "[t]he 
Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of a marital relationship, a biological father's relationship with 
his child is protected under the Constitution." Id. at 24 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 
463 U.S. 248 (1983)). Petitioner Dong's argument was congruous with that of petitioner Lin. See Brief for 
Petitioner Dong, supra note IOI, at 18-21. 
118. Lin, 416 F.3d at 192. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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requirement. Perhaps an argument can be advanced for greater respect of China's 
marriage laws because, as the Chinese Constitution establishes, 121 it is an effective way 
for China to attempt to curtail overpopulation and promote a stable economy and 
society: however inhumane, the ends justify the means. Arguably, the United States 
has an interest in deferring to and respecting the marriage laws enforced by other 
countries in the expectation that the same deference and respect will be afforded to its 
own marriage laws. Finally, there are political and international policy considerations 
at stake; the United States' imposition of its own cultural norms in the intimate realm 
of China's conceptualization of marriage and family laws may be regarded as offensive 
and imperialistic. Thus, individual rights are sacrificed to the "greater good" of 
international stability. Perhaps the BIA and the Third Circuit had these sweeping 
principles in mind. 
However, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in Ma v. Ashcroft, a careful review of 
the development of China's coercive family planning policy reveals the ban on 
''underage" marriage to be an essential part of China's obtrusive population control 
program. 122 Thus, to deny asylum eligibility to a man who would be legally married 
to his persecuted partner, but for an inhumane law, is an absurd conclusion. Absurdity 
aside, the denial of asylum under such a circumstance subverts Congress's intent in 
amending the immigration laws so as to provide protection to people who suffer under 
the atrocious population control practices of the Chinese government. BIA decisions, 
to the contrary, function in direct opposition to the implicit purposes of the enactment 
of section 60l(a) of IIRIRA and, as the Ninth Circuit concluded, are not worthy of 
judicial respect even under the most deferential standards. 
In addition to undermining congressional intent, the BIA's recent interpretation 
of section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA results in harsh and arbitrary consequences, specifically 
the breaking apart ofa family. For example, ifLin's wife applied for asylum based on 
her forced abortion procedure, she would automatically be eligible under the amended 
definition of refugee. However, under the BIA's rule, adopted by the Third Circuit, 
Lin would not be eligible (nor Zou, nor Dong) because his girlfriend was "underage" 
and, therefore, unlawful and incapable of legal registration under the Chinese 
population control program. Conceivably, this rule presents the couple with a 
Robson's choice: either break up the family or avoid such a harsh result by remaining 
in China to face continued persecution and human rights violations. Regrettably, a 
bulk of the responsibility for such an outrageous consequence falls squarely on the 
shoulders of the United States government as a result of the BIA's unjustifiable 
interpretation and Congress's acquiescence. 
Perhaps from the perspective of judicial economy-situating the goal of efficient 
adjudication before that of the protection of human rights (the ends justify the 
means}-the BIA's rule, and Judge Alito's decision in Chen v. Ashcroft, is reasonable 
judicial policy. After all, as Judge Alito points out, requiring proof of a marriage 
certificate is a clean-cut, easily enforceable standard that benefits the legal process by 
circumventing difficult and problematic factual inquiries. Moreover, it deters 
applicants from attempting to falsify intimate relationships in order to gain access to 
I 21. See supra notes I 6-I 8 and accompanying text. 
122. Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553,559 (9th Cir. 2004); see also discussion supra Part II.A. 
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the United States. Thus, the argument proceeds, undesirable results in some cases, as 
atrocious as they may be, are the price to be paid for the efficient function of the 
immigration laws; the ends justify the means. 
Putting aside the fact that the BIA's bright-line rule sabotages congressional 
intent, Judge Alito never explains why immigration policy in this circumstance should 
tum on the legitimacy of a marriage law that is itself a part of a population control 
regime that the United States government has repeatedly decried as coercive and 
atrocious. Rather, Judge Alito declared the outcome of the marriage law to be "incon-
sequential." With all due respect to Justice Alito, it is absurd to declare a law that 
violates an individual's human rights-and at the same time results in that individual's 
ineligibility for asylum and protection of his violated rights-"inconsequential." In 
effect, Judge Alito's pronouncement, although arguably merely dicta, allows an 
inhumane policy to work an additional, and perhaps more appalling, hardship on the 
applicant. 
Absent a bright-line standard, scrutinizing asylum applications filed pursuant to 
section 60l(a) of IIRIRA will consume additional time and judicial resources. 
However, if such a use of resources results in the protection of individuals who are 
exposed to unimaginable violations of their personal rights, it is a valid and reasonable 
use of those resources. Moreover, in the area of immigration law, difficult and 
protracted factual inquiries come with the territory. Denying access to such resources 
in such a grave situation and in an area in which the United States has expressed clear 
opposition is unreasonable and absurd. This denial transforms the United States into 
a Janus-faced hypocrite: the justice system underhandedly supports a policy, while the 
government (perhaps disingenuously) vehemently opposes it. 
It is worth noting that, in his opinion for the Third Circuit, Judge Alito expressed 
reservation as to why "every spouse of a person who undergoes a forced abortion or 
sterilization should be deemed to have 'resisted' the 'coercive population control 
program[,]"' asking: "what if the spouse who did not personally undergo the procedure 
sided with the government and favored the abortion or sterilization?" 123 Although the 
question is fair and reasonable, the answer is simple: the Attorney General, the IJs, the 
BIA and the Courts of Appeals are not only capable, but also are relied upon to 
adequately dispose of asylum applications based on fraudulent pretenses. Judge 
Alito's argument proves too much. If government officials and judges can scrutinize 
whether spouses have in fact been persecuted, what makes them unable to engage in 
the same analysis concerning non-spouses? Are government officials and the courts 
so afraid of opening the door to a greater number of asylum applications that they 
would be willing to prevent men and women who have suffered human rights 
violations from obtaining asylum? 
The Third Circuit's final rationale for not protecting the unmarried partners of 
individuals who suffer an abortion and/or sterilization procedure was extinguished by 
a subsequent act of Congress. Judge Alito looked to the 1,000 person-per-fiscal-year 
cap on the number of refugees permitted access to asylum under section 60l(a) of 
IIRIRA as an indication of Congress's intent that the statute be interpreted narrowly 
so as to preclude asylum eligibility to unmarried partners. However, this limitation 
123. Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221,226 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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was repealed pursuant to the REAL ID Act of2005. 124 Therefore, what Judge Alito 
saw as an implicit expression of congressional intent to restrict protection now reads 
as an express indication that asylum protection should be expanded. Accordingly, as 
the Second Circuit noted in Lin, ''a construction of IIRIRA § 60l(a) can no longer 
rely-in whole or in part-on the existence ofan annual cap." 125 
Analyzing the radically different decisions handed down by the Third and the 
Ninth Circuits while interpreting the same statute and relying on the same BIA 
precedent decision, it is clear that the BIA in C-Y-Z- did not adequately explain the 
rationale behind its reading of section 60l{a) ofIIRIRA Thus, given that the BIA is 
the body solely responsible and most adequately situated to interpret and apply the 
immigration laws, it is equally clear that the Second Circuit was correct to remand Lin 
so that the BIA might clarify its rationale. Debatably, until the BIA complies with the 
Second Circuit's demands, the Circuit Courts will remain split; the conservative 
circuits will favor a narrow interpretation of section 60l{a), whereas liberal circuits 
will interpret the statute broadly in order to protect unmarried partners. 
B. How the BIA Should Decide Lin v. United States Department of Justice on 
Remand from the Second Circuit 
First, and most specifically, the BIA should grant asylum to all three petitioners: 
Lin, Dong, and Zou. Although section 60 l (a) of IIRIRA provides ample reason to 
expand asylum protection to the unmarried partner of an individual persecuted under 
China's coercive population control policies, asylum should be granted to Lin, Dong, 
and Zou because "in a well-documented and credible case, plausible in light of country 
conditions, the applicant[s] [have] articulated [their partners'] and [their] opposition 
to a compulsory government policy that fails to respect fundamental human rights, and 
the punishment they individually and jointly suffered because of that opposition." 126 
Independent of their marital status, Lin, Dong, and Zou were victims of persecution. 
Upon their return to China, each man reasonably faces, among other penalties, 
sterilization, fines, loss of employment, and the reoccurrence of the atrocities they 
were already forced to endure, namely the forced abortion of their children. Why 
should refugee status ever turn on the marital status of the individual applicant? 127 
Second, and more generally, the BIA should elucidate the proper reason for 
granting asylum to the Chinese applicant in C-Y-Z-. Standing alone, circumstances 
such as those faced by the applicants in Lin are sufficient to guarantee their protection 
under the asylum laws of the United States. The amended definition of refugee 
supplied by section 601 (a) of IIRIRA merely specifies that certain individuals who 
have been forced to undergo invasive medical procedures as a result of China's 
population control policies, or who have suffered because of their opposition to 
undergoing such procedures, or have a well-founded fear of being subjected to such 
124. See supra notes 63-64, and accompanying text. 
125. Lin v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 416 F.3d 184, 188 n.l (2d Cir. 2005). 
126. In re C-Y-Z-, 211. & N. Dec. 915,921 (BJ.A. 1997) (Rosenburg, Board Member, concurring). 
127. Notably, where the marital status of the individual is dispositive of her ability to qualify for refugee 
status, other individuals who are not permitted to marry (i.e., gays, lesbians, and transgendered individuals) 
will be ineligible even though their partners suffer the same type of persecution. 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 189 2007
2007] MARITAL STATUS & ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY 189 
persecution, are eligible for asylum under the definition. 128 The amended definition, 
therefore, should not be interpreted as a limiting provision, precluding an applicant's 
ability to establish his refugee eligibility based on the pre-amendment definition of 
refugee. Rather, the amendment should be interpreted as a clear congressional 
mandate that these individuals qualify as ·refugees. 
As Board Member Rosenburg so aptly recognized in her concurrence in C-Y-Z-, 
"[t]he right to privacy, the right to have a family, the right to bodily integrity, and the 
right to unfettered reproductive choice are fundamental individual rights, recognized 
domestically and internationally." 129 The belief that these are inalienable rights, along 
with the choice to exercise them and the conviction that such a decision must be 
revered, not trampled, constitutes a "political opinion" regardless of whether such a 
choice is in direct opposition to governmental policies. Because the individual's 
choice to remain fertile and procreate in violation of government policy is a political 
opinion, the forced infliction of abortion and/or sterilization (not to mention other 
coercive tactics that are implemented) is persecution on the basis of political opinion, 
which is protected by the statute both before and after the amendment. 
Regardless of whether an individual is capable ofarticulating and conceptualizing 
his or her opinion and rights in a sophisticated manner, he or she holds a political 
opinion in the eyes of the law ifhe or she opposes or resists a coercive governmental 
policy on personal, ethical, religious, or philosophical grounds. In broadly defining 
refugee and political opinion to embrace those persecuted on the basis of political 
opinion, and in enacting section 601 ( a) of IIRIRA, it was Congress's intentto provide 
for the protection of individuals who are persecuted on the basis of political opinion; 
it is the function of the courts to adhere to congressional intent. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If and when the BIA reconsiders Lin, Dong, and Zou's asylum applications, it 
should grant asylum to all three applicants. Additionally, it should extend the 
protection of refugee status and asylum to the unmarried partners of individuals who 
were forced to undergo sterilization and/or abortion procedures as a result of China's 
coercive family planning practices. To hold otherwise, whether for the sake of 
international policy, procedural efficiency, or to avoid intractable factual inquiries, 
inextricably binds the United States to China as a partner in the continued violation of 
the human rights of thousands of Chinese citizens. 
128. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
129. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 921 (Rosenburg, Board Member, concurring). 
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